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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CRIMINALIZING SILENCE: HIIBEL AND THE CONTINUING
EXPANSION OF THE TERRY DOCTRINE

E. MARTIN ESTRADA*

I. INTRODUCTION
It has not gone unnoticed that the Terry doctrine has expanded well beyond
its original delimitations as set forth by the Supreme Court in 1968.1 Whereas
a Terry stop was originally conceived as a narrow exception to the requirement
that all governmental seizures be accompanied by probable cause—a
nominally innocuous “stop and frisk”—the Supreme Court and its lower-court
counterparts have since granted police officers broad arrest-like powers in
executing a Terry stop. These powers include the authority to move suspects
and their passengers to different locations, detain suspects for extended periods
of time, handcuff and point weapons at suspects, and force suspects to lie
prone on the ground.2 This expansion has been criticized as a pernicious
broadening of police investigatory powers by some,3 while heralded as an
important means of allowing for effective law enforcement by others.4
* Associate, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP; Law Clerk to the Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2003-2004; Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert J. Timlin,
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 2002-2003; J.D., Stanford Law School,
2002; B.A., University of California at Irvine, 1998. I would like to extend special thanks to
Professor George Fisher, Judge John Crown Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, for his
astute comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article and his invaluable mentoring. I
am also indebted to Kerry C. O’Neill for her detailed editing of earlier drafts and thoughtful
comments. The views expressed in this article are solely my own.
1. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that “[t]he last
decade . . . has witnessed a multifaceted expansion of Terry.”); United States v. Chaidez, 919
F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that in recent years, the Terry doctrine has “expanded
beyond [its] original contours, in order to permit reasonable police action when probable cause is
arguably lacking.”); Robert Weisberg, A New Legal Realism for Criminal Procedure, 49 BUFF. L.
REV. 909, 913 (2001) (observing that “the courts have found ample help in Terry in expanding
search-and-detention power.”); Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken
Promises: The Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567, 578 (1991)
(arguing that subsequent Supreme Court cases have led to “the ultimate destruction of Terry as
conceived by its creators.”).
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 1013
279
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In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada,5 the Court, by holding
that officers could compel suspects detained pursuant to a lawful Terry stop to
identify themselves without violating the constitutional protections afforded by
the Fourth Amendment, wrote another chapter in the Terry doctrine’s
unyielding expansion. Hiibel, however, is not a mere furtive advance of the
Terry doctrine. Rather, it represents a sea change in our understanding of the
very nature of a Terry stop.6 Unlike prior Terry-stop cases, Hiibel extends the
Terry doctrine over terrain previously considered sacrosanct and absolute: the
right not to speak. Although the Court has chiefly addressed the right to not
speak through the guise of the First Amendment, the Court in earlier days had
indicated that a key premise underlying its creation of the Terry doctrine and
its complicity in the Terry doctrine’s expansion was that officers would not be
permitted to compel speech. The Hiibel Court’s departure from the traditional
right to not speak evinces the stark metamorphosis that the Terry stop has
undergone since its original, limited inception.
In favoring governmental law enforcement interests over core individual
privacy interests, the Hiibel decision may be the doctrinal flood waters
precipitating a slippery slope of eroding Fourth Amendment rights, predicted
and feared by dissenting Justices in previous Terry doctrine cases. Hiibel
discards earlier Terry search limitations that tethered searches and seizures to
officer safety and ensured that all investigations would be as respectful of
privacy interests as possible. With Hiibel, the Terry stop is evolving into a far
more encompassing constitutional creation than originally contemplated by the
(1998) (discussing the dangers in lower courts’ “increasing use of broad categorical judgments in
place of particularized, individual suspicion” in applying the Terry doctrine); Tracey Maclin,
When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 35
(1994) (stating that Terry’s “narrow exception has been stretched and distorted so that
government intrusions are now permitted in a variety of contexts that have nothing to do with the
safety of patrol officers or the circumstances at issue in Terry.”); Williams, supra note 1, at 583–
84 (stating that due to the Terry doctrine’s expansion, race continues to be a divisive factor in
police-community relations).
4. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 911, 951–52 (1998) (lauding the clarity of the Terry doctrine as developed in subsequent
Supreme Court cases); Christo Lassiter, The Stop and Frisk of Criminal Street Gang Members, 14
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 21–22 (1995) (“The expansion of Terry to include greater invasions of
Fourth Amendment liberty interests in privacy and property quite properly reflect a changing
panorama in the deteriorating mores in society and its crime fighting needs.”).
5. 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
6. See Shaun B. Spencer, Nevada Case Threatens to Expand Terry Stops, 48 BOSTON B. J.
27, 28 (2004) (stating, prior to the Court’s issuance of Hiibel, that to accept any of Nevada=s
arguments in favor of permitting officers to compel a detained individual to identify herself
“would effect the most dramatic expansion in the Terry doctrine’s thirty-five-year history.”);
David L. Hudson, Jr., ‘Nevada Cowboy’ Loses Privacy Showdown, A.B.A. J. E-Report, June 25,
2004 (presenting contrasting attorney views describing Hiibel as either “a grave loss for privacy
or an important victory for the police.”).
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Court in Terry. As such, the Court has critically altered the Terry doctrine
landscape and further widened the Fourth Amendment hinterland that lies
between freedom and traditional arrest.
This article seeks to highlight Hiibel’s significance in expanding the Terry
doctrine.7 Part II provides some important background to Hiibel: the Terry
doctrine’s inception and the Court’s later expansion of the Terry doctrine. Part
III briefly outlines the legal history of “stop and identify” statutes and
discusses their triumph in Hiibel. Part IV discusses Hiibel’s conflict with the
right not to speak under the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment and
argues that Hiibel undercuts a central premise in the Court=s creation of the
Terry doctrine—that officers would not be permitted to compel speech during
a Terry encounter. Part V addresses the Hiibel Court’s minimization of the
weapon-based rationale for searches and seizures that featured so prominently
in Terry and later cases. This part also argues that Hiibel greatly expands the
peculiar legal gap between freedom and arrest now occupied by Terry. Part VI
proposes an approach to curbing the erosion on individual rights through
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis—properly valuing privacy
interests. Part VII concludes.
II. THE BACKDROP: TERRY AND THE REMARKABLE EXPANSION
OF THE TERRY DOCTRINE
A.

The Terry Doctrine’s Humble Beginning

In Terry v. Ohio,8 the Warren Court confronted the constitutionality of a
“stop and frisk” investigation, a law-enforcement technique in which an officer
temporarily detains and searches a suspect without probable cause.9 As a
preliminary matter, the Court rejected the contention that a “stop and frisk”

7. This article does not analyze the Fifth Amendment aspects of Hiibel. Miranda issues,
though, were an important feature of the decision. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460–61 (discussing
the inapplicability of Miranda to the compelled statements at issue), and id. at 2463 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “the compelled statement at issue in this case is clearly testimonial” and
thus protected by the Fifth Amendment).
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9. The Court’s notion of what a Astop and frisk@ encompassed was far from naive. The
Court described a “stop and frisk” as a “procedure performed in public by a policeman while the
citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised.” Id. at 16–17. Eschewing
delicacy, the Court went into further detail on the intricacies of a “stop and frisk”: “Consider the
following apt description: ‘[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the
prisoner’s body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner’s arms and armpits, waistline
and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.’”
Id. at 17 n.13 (quoting L.L. Priar & T.F. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 481, 481 (1954)).
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investigation falls wholly outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment:10
“[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away,” the Court stated, “he has ‘seized’ that person.”11 Furthermore, the
Court described the conclusion that a police pat-down is not a search as
“nothing less than sheer torture of the English language.”12 The Court
recognized that even frisking an individual’s outside clothing for weapons
“constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security,”
and “an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”13
Nevertheless, the Court modified its previous Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence,14 and analyzed the police officer’s conduct under the “Fourth
Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures,”15 a method that involved a balancing of the governmental interests in
the search and seizure against the invasion of privacy entailed by the search
and seizure.16 Given the societal importance of allowing police officers to
investigate nascent criminal activity and the physical dangers inherent in
confronting suspected criminals in the streets, the Court opined that is was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for officers to briefly detain
individuals suspected of criminal conduct for investigatory purposes and
10. Professor Corinna Barrett Lain has pointed out that neither the State nor its amicus
curiae supporters raised the contention that a “stop and frisk” is not covered by the Fourth
Amendment during Terry’s litigation before the Supreme Court. Rather, they argued that the
“stop and frisk” at issue was justified by something approximating reasonable suspicion. Corinna
Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the
Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1442–43 (2004). The Court itself
suggested that this position was put forward by the Ohio Court of Appeals. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16
n.12.
11. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 24–25.
14. Commentators have described the Terry Court”s determination that a “stop and frisk” is
covered under the Fourth Amendment, yet not subject to the requirements of the Warrant Clause,
as a compromise. E.g., Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 733, 777 (2000) (stating that in Terry, the Court sided with neither the State nor
the defense); David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 12–13 (1994) (describing Terry as “a series of compromises”); Tracey Maclin, The
Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1258, 1269 (1990) (stating that in Terry, “[t]he Court attempted to satisfy everybody with its
ends-oriented decision.”); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 422 (1988) (describing the Terry decision
as a “general compromise”). But see Lain, supra note 10, at 1443 (arguing that Terry was not
truly a compromise between opposing positions on whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a
“stop and frisk,” but instead was “a profoundly pro-law enforcement decision that gave to the
police almost all they had asked of the Court”).
15. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
16. Id. at 20–21.
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search the outside of their clothing for weapons: “[W]e cannot blind ourselves
to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable
cause for an arrest.”17 At the same time, however, the Court circumscribed
police authority to detain and frisk individuals without probable cause,
characterizing its holding as establishing “narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer.”18 Only
where an officer is possessed of a reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity
may be afoot” and has a “reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety”19 may
the officer pat-down the suspect, and even then “the officer’s action [must be]
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.”20 The Court stressed that the “sole
justification” for the instant search was “the protection of the police officer and
others nearby,” and it was therefore necessary that the frisk of the suspect be
correspondingly confined to detecting weapons.21
Concurring in the opinion, Justice White cautioned that the Court’s
approval of the “stop and frisk” in Terry should not be understood to signal an
erosion of existing Fourth Amendment protections. While noting that “[t]here
is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing
questions to anyone on the streets[,]” Justice White stressed that a suspect does
not forfeit her right to not speak merely by virtue of her having raised the
reasonable suspicion of an officer.22 Even during a Terry stop, the Fourth
Amendment protected a suspect from being compelled to answer an officer’s
inquiries: “Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers
may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest,
although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”23
In Dunaway v. New York,24 the Court elucidated its holding in Terry. The
Court explained that central to its approval of the “stop and frisk” at issue in
Terry was its determination that “the intrusion involved in a ‘stop and frisk’
was so much less severe than that involved in traditional ‘arrests[.]’”25 It was
willing in Terry to suspend the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause
requirement for seizures with respect to a “stop and frisk” because of a Terry
stop’s “less intrusive” qualities.26 The narrow exception to the probable cause

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 30.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
Id.
442 U.S. 200 (1979).
Id. at 209.
Id. at 210.
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requirement was justified in Terry and later Terry doctrine cases, the Court
stated, “only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion
associated with an arrest.”27 Given this summary of the Terry doctrine, the
Court held in Dunaway that the officers departed from the “narrowly defined
intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny” by removing the defendant to an
interrogation room in a police station.28
B.

Terry’s Great Push Forward

Since Terry and Dunaway, the Court has continued to stress that Terry
represents a “limited exception” to the general rule that a seizure must be
justified by probable cause and to emphasize the differences between a Terry
stop and a traditional arrest.29 The Court in United States v. Place, en route to
holding that a ninety-minute seizure of luggage went beyond the limits of a
Terry stop and thus rendered a subsequent property seizure unconstitutional,
noted that “the Terry exception to the probable-cause requirement is premised
on the notion that a Terry-type stop of the person is substantially less intrusive
of a person’s liberty interests than a formal arrest.”30 Similarly, in Illinois v.
Wardlow, the Court explained that the risk of detaining innocent individuals
through a Terry stop is an acceptable risk precisely because a Terry stop falls
far short of an arrest: “The Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply
allowing the officer to briefly investigate further. If the officer does not learn
facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go
on his way.”31
Yet, despite its repeated representations that Terry stops are limited in
scope and constitute a far less intrusive breed of seizure than an arrest
supported by probable cause, the Court has steadily expanded the authority of
officers to impose upon individual liberties during a Terry encounter. In
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, officers effecting a routine traffic stop for an expired
license plate ordered Mimms to exit his car and stand alongside it.32 After
Mimms exited his vehicle, officers frisked him and discovered a concealed
weapon.33 Observing that it was undisputed that the officers were entitled
under Terry to briefly detain the vehicle, the Court held that the “additional
intrusion” of further ordering Mimms out of his automobile could “only be
described as de minimis.”34 Justice Marshall criticized the majority’s de
minimis approach as a sharp departure from Terry’s requirement that any
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983).
528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. at 111.
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intrusion on an individual’s personal liberty be accompanied by individualized
suspicion.35 The reasons for the officers’ initial seizure of Mimms, Justice
Marshall pointed out, had “no relation at all” to the officers’ order that he exit
the car to be frisked.36 Justice Stevens similarly accused the majority opinion
of eviscerating the requirement of individualized suspicion and “leav[ing]
police discretion utterly without limits.”37 Justices Marshall’s and Stevens’
sober forewarning that Mimms would lead to a slippery slope of Terry doctrine
expansion proved prescient. The Court temporally expanded the scope of a
Terry stop in Michigan v. Summers, where it held that a Terry stop may extend
in duration beyond the brief time period approved of in Terry itself.38 In
Maryland v. Wilson, the Court extended Mimms to hold that officers may order
passengers as well as drivers out of vehicles detained pursuant to Terry.39
Although the Court acknowledged that “there is not the same basis for ordering
the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out,” in light of
concerns for officer safety, the Court—echoing its de minimis approach in
Mimms—held that “the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal.”40
Building upon the Court’s flexible approach to Terry, the lower courts
have taken license to expand the scope of a Terry stop far “beyond [Terry’s]
original contours.”41 This expansion has been “multifaceted” and broad.42
Officers executing a Terry stop may now handcuff a suspect and draw their
weapons in the suspect’s direction,43 force a suspect to lie prone,44 and move a

35. Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 114.
37. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Another key fault in the majority
opinion cited by Justices Marshall and Stevens was the manner in which the Court adjudicated
Mimms: in a per curiam summary reversal, without oral argument, and solely on the basis of
certiorari papers. See id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. 452 U.S. 692, 700 & n.12 (1981).
39. 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
40. Id. at 414–15. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, again dissented, cautioning
that the Court’s holding unwarrantedly expanded the scope of Terry stops by allowing an officer
to order car passengers out of a vehicle without any individualized suspicion that the passenger
poses a risk to the officer. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990).
42. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993). See also Mark A. Godsey,
When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715,
728–733 (1994) (discussing the Terry doctrine’s expansion within the lower courts).
43. United States v. Vargas, 369 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that use of handcuffs
did not transform Terry stop into arrest since such force was “reasonable under the
circumstances”); United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 789–91 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that officers did not exceed limits of Terry stop by drawing weapons and handcuffing
suspect whom they suspected was armed); Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315,
1320 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is well settled that when an officer reasonably believes force is
necessary to protect his own safety or the safety of the public, measures used to restrain
individuals, such as stopping them at gunpoint and handcuffing them, are reasonable.”); United
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suspect to a different location.45 As a practical matter, therefore, a modern
Terry stop bears little resemblance to the “stop and frisk” at issue in Terry
itself.46 In fact, a Terry stop is oftentimes scarcely distinguishable from a
traditional arrest.47 As the Seventh Circuit has observed, “[f]or better or for
worse, the trend has led to the permitting of the use of handcuffs, the placing of
suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures of
force more traditionally associated with arrest than with investigatory
detention.”48
The Terry doctrine’s rapid expansion within the lower courts is hardly
surprising in light of the Court’s creation in Terry of a boundless “reasonable
suspicion” standard—a standard established by facts observed by an officer
and inferences derived from those facts that, considered as a whole,
“reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”49 While the Warrant Clause previously
controlled Fourth Amendment analysis,50 with Terry, subjective
States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989) (use of handcuffs to prevent suspect from
fleeing did not automatically convert Terry stop into an arrest).
But see United States v. Miles, 247 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Under ordinary
circumstances, drawing weapons and using handcuffs are not part of a Terry stop.”); United
States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating “that the use of handcuffs, being
one of the most recognizable indicia of traditional arrest, ‘substantially aggravates the
intrusiveness’ of a putative Terry stop.”).
44. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1227–28 (7th Cir. 1994) (“When a suspect is
considered dangerous, requiring him to lie face down on the ground is the safest way for police
officers to approach him, handcuff him and finally determine whether he carries any weapons.”);
Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1991) (acceptable to make suspect lie
prone on the ground during a Terry stop); United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.
1983).
45. United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 56 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “it is well established
that officers may ask (or force) a suspect to move as part of a lawful Terry stop.”); Halvorsen v.
Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 684–85 (9th Cir. 1998) (approving of officers forcibly moving a Terry
suspect from one location to another); United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1576–77 (11th Cir. 1995).
46. See Harris, supra note 3, at 1021 (stating that “the Supreme Court of 1968 . . . might not
recognize Terry as lower courts apply it.”).
47. See Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased
Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry “Stop and Frisk,” 50 OKLA. L. REV 451, 452 (1997)
(stating that the line between a Terry stop and an arrest has become blurred and “[t]his blur is the
result of the lower courts expansion of the Terry decision and the Supreme Court’s reliance on an
artificial reasonableness standard and colorblind constitutionalism.”); Godsey, supra note 42, at
733 (“Terry stops—as a whole––have become much more intrusive than they were just a few
years ago. It is commonplace for these investigatory detentions to involve handcuffs, drawn
weapons, the lying-prone position, the removing of the suspects to police cruisers, and other
forms of force that used to be appropriate only for full-scale arrests.”).
48. Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224–25.
49. Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
50. Sundby, supra note 14, at 386–91 (describing predominance of the Warrant Clause prior
to Terry).
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reasonableness “emerged as the central Fourth Amendment mandate and
touchstone,”51 engendering “a whole new benchmark of individualized
suspicion.”52 Although commentators differ in their evaluation of the ascent of
reasonableness analysis via Terry,53 even calling for a more explicit
proportionality approach to determining whether a search runs afoul of the
Fourth Amendment,54 it is clear that the reasonable suspicion standard lends
itself to broad applicability.55 What we are left with, then, is a haphazard, yet
one-directional, broadening of police authority during a Terry stop.
The growing similarity of a Terry stop to an arrest is unsettling. The courts
have made clear that the constitutional safeguards afforded to an individual
during an arrest are diluted in the Terry-stop context. First and foremost, the
standard of proof necessary to justify a Terry stop is far less burdensome:
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. Although the probable cause
requirement is by no means a substantial investigative hurdle,56 reasonable
suspicion requires far fewer objective observations to justify a seizure.
Whereas probable cause requires information justifying a reasonable belief that
a crime has been committed by the person seized,57 a reasonable suspicion for
51. Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1097, 1098 (1998).
52. Sundby, supra note 14, at 397.
53. Compare Amar, supra note 51, at 1118–20 (approving of Terry’s role in establishing
reasonableness as the central Fourth Amendment measuring stick, partly because of the
standard’s malleability in governing a “vast and protean set of governmental action”), with Scott
E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and Slobogin, 72
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1136 (1998) (favoring Fourth Amendment analysis with probable cause
as the centerpiece and stating that “[a] broadly defined reasonableness balancing test . . . largely
places the citizen’s Fourth Amendment fate in the hands of others.”).
54. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053 (1998) (calling for a proportionality
approach to the Fourth Amendment such that the lawfulness of a particular search and seizure is
analyzed by weighing the degree of invasiveness of the search against the strength of the
governmental interests involved); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1991).
55. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
56. See United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1993) (characterizing probable
cause as a low standard of proof); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81
TEX. L. REV. 951, 996 (2003) (stating that probable cause is a “percentage nestled somewhere
between .01% and 51%.”); Paul Wake, Helping Children Through the Juvenile Justice System: A
Guide for Utah Defense Attorneys, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 31, 47 n.68 (2000) (describing probable
cause as a “low standard”).
57. Although there is no rigid formulation of probable cause, this general definition has been
applied by the Court. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 557 n.6 (1978) (“[P]robable
cause for arrest requires information justifying a reasonable belief that a crime has been
committed and that a particular person committed it . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Other definitions roughly follow this formulation. See, e.g., United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d
1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Probable cause exists when, given the totality of the circumstances,
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Terry purposes requires only a “minimal level of objective justification for
making the stop.”58 Reasonable suspicion can be established by information
that is “different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable
cause,” and that is “less reliable.”59 The Court has noted that “‘reasonable
suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.”60 Further, the
Court has made clear that courts are to give deference to a police officer’s
inferences of reasonable suspicion drawn from her law enforcement
experiences61 and that reviewing courts must give “due weight to inferences
drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
officers.”62 The layers of deference make it difficult to second-guess an initial
finding of reasonable suspicion.63 Considering the relatively flimsy objective
basis needed to justify a determination that reasonable suspicion exists and the
deference to be accorded that determination, Terry’s reasonable suspicion
standard can hardly be deemed insurmountable.64
Moreover, in Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court noted that the
“comparatively nonthreatening character” of Terry stops “explains the absence
of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of
Miranda.”65 Based on this statement in Berkemer, courts have held that
officers are generally not obligated to give suspects Miranda warnings during a

a reasonable person could believe there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
would be found in a particular place.”); United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir.
1993) (stating that “probable cause merely requires that the facts available to the officer would
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be . . . useful as evidence
of a crime”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524,
527 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Probable cause requires ‘a reasonable belief, evaluated in light of the
officer’s experience and the practical considerations of everyday life,’ that a crime has been, is
being, or is about to be committed.”) (quoting United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
58. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
59. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
60. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)
(stating reasonable suspicion “falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the
evidence standard”).
61. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996).
62. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699.
63. Cf. Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the
Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 889–93 (2002) (discussing the
levels of discretion afforded a finding of reasonable suspicion on appellate review).
64. See Martin H. Belsky, Random vs. Suspicion-Based Drug Testing in the Public
Schools—A Surprising Civil Liberties Dilemma, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2002) (stating
that “[t]he courts will most likely accept any articulated basis for a showing of reasonableness.”);
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2170 (2002) (stating that
“Terry’s requirements are easily met.”).
65. 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
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Terry stop in order to render a suspect’s answers to interrogation admissible
during trial.66 In contrast, Miranda warnings are generally obligatory for
admitting the fruit of a post-arrest interrogation.67 Rendering Miranda
inapplicable to Terry stops substantially augments the peril to personal liberty
created by Terry’s expansion since a broader realm of police investigatory
conduct is shielded from Miranda protections.68
Accordingly, the courts have overseen a steady expansion of the Terry
doctrine. Although police authority during a Terry stop still bears significant
restrictions,69 it is clear that the Terry doctrine had evolved far beyond its
original conceptualization as a narrow exception to the probable cause
requirement.70 Hiibel represents a salient step in the Terry doctrine’s
continuing expansion.
III. THE RISE, STUMBLE, AND TRIUMPH OF “STOP AND IDENTIFY” STATUTES
Hiibel involved the constitutionality of a state “stop and identify” statute.71
A “stop and identify” statute typically requires that when a police officer
detains an individual under suspicion of criminal activity, the individual must

66. United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that “most
Terry stops do not trigger the detainee’s Miranda rights.”); United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79,
92 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that Terry stops do not generally implicate Miranda); United States v.
Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109–10 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276, 281 (7th
Cir. 1994); but see United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that
whether an individual is “in custody” for Miranda purposes is a separate inquiry from whether a
seizure is unreasonable under Terry); United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464–65 (10th Cir. 1993).
In Hiibel, the Court held that the State did not violate Hiibel’s Fifth Amendment rights
by compelling him to give his identity during the Terry stop but declined to address the issue of
whether such an action could ever violate the Fifth Amendment. See 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461
(2004).
67. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[F]ailure to
give [Miranda] warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally
requires exclusion of any statements obtained.”); Jackson v. Giurbino, 364 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“Miranda rights vest in the context of custodial interrogations.”); United States v.
Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) (Miranda warnings mandatory for post-arrest
interrogation).
68. See Godsey, supra note 42, at 747–48 (stating that the expansion of Terry creates a
constitutional dilemma by narrowing the realm of seizures affected by Miranda).
69. A Terry stop requires articulable facts justifying an “objective justification for making
the stop,” not merely a hunch that criminal activity has occurred. See Wardlow v. Illinois, 528
U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Furthermore, although there is no defined time limit for a Terry stop, the
Court has stated that the length of a detention can convert a Terry stop into an arrest. United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1983).
70. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
71. 124 S. Ct. at 2456.
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provide the officer with some form of identification.72 “Stop and identify”
statutes are an outcropping of common law vagrancy and loitering
provisions,73 laws that were intended to deter “idlers” from engaging in
criminal activity and to create a source of cheap labor for regional land
owners.74 The modern source of the various state manifestations of the “stop
and identify” requirement is the Uniform Arrest Act of 1941, an illustrative
precursor to the Terry doctrine, which provides that an officer may detain any
person “who he has reasonable grounds to suspect is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name,
address, business abroad and whither he is going[,]” and that failure to provide
identification authorizes further detention.75
Prior to Hiibel, the Supreme Court’s treatment of “stop and identify”
statutes was critical. In Brown v. Texas, the Court reversed a conviction under
a Texas “stop and identify” statute where the defendant had refused to identify
himself after officers detained him without any specific suspicion of
wrongdoing.76 Because the initial seizure was “not based on objective criteria”
and thus created “the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices,” the Court
held that application of the Texas “stop and identify” statute at issue violated
the Fourth Amendment.77 The Court, however, expressly reserved the question
of “whether an individual may be punished for refusing to identify himself in

72. See 1 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 3:7 (3d ed. 1996)
(stating that “stop and identify” statutes authorize “the detention of individuals under suspicious
circumstances and require the person so detained to provide identification and an explanation for
his or her conduct”). See also Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456 (citing various state “stop and identify”
statutes).
73. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456; Alan D. Hallock, Note, Stop-and-Identify Statutes After
Kolender v. Lawson: Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1057,
1059 n.18 (1984) (stating that “[t]he origin of modern stop-and-identify statutes can be traced to
vagrancy and loitering provisions”).
74. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161–62, 161 n.4 (1972) (noting that
vagrancy laws were a remnant of archaic feudal laws designed to discourage movement of
workers and to prevent idlers from engaging in criminal activity); Ahmed A. White, A Different
Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913–1924, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 667, 677–78 (2004) (stating that English vagrancy laws held “labor-regulating
functions” by forcing the poor to work while preventing them from traveling in search of better
wages); Joel D. Berg, Note, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering Laws, 69 CHI.KENT L. REV. 461, 462–64 (1993) (discussing the history of English vagrancy laws and stating
that vagrancy laws of the Eighteenth Century, upon which American models were based, were
designed to prevent crime and to put able bodies to work).
75. UNIF. ARREST ACT OF 1941 § 2, reprinted in Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act,
28 VA. L. REV. 315, 320–21 (1942). See also COOK, supra note 72, at § 3.7 n.66 (quoting section
2 of the Act).
76. 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979).
77. Id. at 52–53.
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the context of a lawful investigatory stop which satisfies Fourth Amendment
requirements.”78
Thereafter, the Court in Kolender v. Lawson invalidated a conviction under
California’s “knock and announce” statute making it a misdemeanor for
anyone “[w]ho loiters or wanders upon the streets” to refuse “to identify
himself and to account for his presence” upon an officer’s request.79 Because
the California state courts had interpreted the statute to require that an
individual present “credible and reliable” identification, the Court held that the
California statute was unconstitutionally vague in that it failed “to establish
standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has
complied with the subsequent identification requirement.”80 Again, the Court
declined to reach the issue of whether compelling an individual to identify
herself runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.81
Justice Brennan, concurring in the decision, however, did address the
Fourth Amendment challenge, and he did so unfavorably to the “stop and
identify” requirement. “States,” he concluded, “may not authorize the arrest
and criminal prosecution of an individual for failing to produce identification
or further information on demand by a police officer.”82 This conclusion,
Justice Brennan stated, followed from the strict limitations the Court had
imposed on Terry stops, including Justice White’s concurring statement in
Terry that “refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.”83 While
acknowledging that compelling suspects to identify themselves would serve
important law enforcement interests, Justice Brennan opined that “the balance
struck by the Fourth Amendment between the public interest in effective law
enforcement and the equally public interest in safeguarding individual freedom
and privacy from arbitrary governmental interference” weighed against
expanding police power in this manner.84
With Brown and Kolender, combined with Justice White’s concurrence in
Terry, the constitutionality of “stop and identify” statutes hovered in doubt.85
Not surprisingly, following the Court’s issuance of these decisions, some lower
courts determined that officers were forbidden under the Fourth Amendment

78. Id. at 53 n.3.
79. 461 U.S. 352, 353–54, 353 n.1 (1983) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (1970)).
80. Id. at 361.
81. Id. at 361 n.10.
82. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 364–65 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968)
(White, J., concurring)).
84. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. Hallock, supra note 73, at 1075–80 (discussing uncertain constitutionality of the “stop
and identify” requirement).
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from compelling individuals to identify themselves during Terry encounters.86
Others, noting that the Supreme Court had reserved the issue, held otherwise,87
or deemed the issue unsettled.88
With the precedential indications signaling the imminent demise of “stop
and identify” statutes, the Court dramatically changed course in Hiibel, where
it resolved the lower-court split in favor of the constitutionality of “stop and
identify” statutes. The facts in Hiibel, taken from the Court’s opinion, relate
an unremarkable occurrence. After receiving an afternoon telephone call
reporting a possible roadside assault, a sheriff’s deputy was dispatched to
investigate.89 The deputy discovered a man, later identified as Hiibel, on a
Nevada road standing alongside his truck while a young woman (Hiibel’s
daughter) sat inside the truck’s cabin.90 The deputy approached Hiibel, who
appeared to be intoxicated, in order to investigate the criminal report.91 It was
undisputed that the deputy possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Hiibel
based on the domestic assault report. During the course of the encounter, the
deputy requested that Hiibel produce identification. Hiibel refused and asked
why the officer wanted his identification, to which the deputy responded that
he was conducting an investigation. Thereafter, Hiibel refused the officer’s
repeated requests for identification.92 Instead, Hiibel placed his hands behind
his back, challenging the officer to arrest him and take him to jail.
Unfortunately for Hiibel, the officer accepted his challenge and arrested him.93

86. Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
under the Fourth Amendment, officers may not “compel[] an individual to identify himself during
a Terry stop”); Martinelli v. City of Beaumont, 820 F.2d 1491, 1494 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
“arrest[ing] a person for refusing to identify herself during a lawful Terry stop violates the Fourth
Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.”); Timmons v. City of
Montgomery, 658 F. Supp. 1086, 1093 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (agreeing with Justice Brennan and the
Ninth Circuit that compelling identification violates the Fourth Amendment); State v. White, 640
P.2d 1061, 1069 (Wash. 1982) (holding, based on Justice White’s concurrence in Terry, that “a
detainee’s refusal to disclose his name, address, and other information cannot be the basis of an
arrest.”).
87. Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that because officers
were constitutionally permitted to ask for identification, officers did not violate the Constitution
by arresting Oliver for failing to present identification in violation of a Utah “stop and identify”
statute); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. ex rel. Humboldt, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002)
(holding that because “[s]uch an invasion is minimal at best[,]” officers did not violate the Fourth
Amendment in arresting an individual for failing to identify himself during a Terry stop).
88. At least four circuits had held, based on the Supreme Court’s reservation of the issue,
that the right to refuse to identify oneself during a Terry stop is not clearly established. See
Risbridger v. Connelly, 275 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing circuit positions).
89. 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2455 (2004). See also Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203 (recounting facts).
90. 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Hiibel was later convicted of resisting a public officer by not identifying
himself as required under section 171.123 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, a
“stop and identify” statute which provides that any person lawfully detained by
an officer “shall identify himself.”94
Applying Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis and balancing
Hiibel’s individual privacy interests against the State’s law-enforcementrelated interests in coercing him to identify himself, the Court determined that
the scales tipped in the State’s favor. The Court noted that “[a]sking questions
is an essential part of police investigations,” and that its prior decisions “make
clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted
part of many Terry stops.”95 Compelling an individual to identify himself
during a Terry stop, the Court stated, serves important governmental interests
because “[k]nowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is
wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder.”96
In the specific context at issue, a domestic violence investigation, the Court
observed that officers “need to know whom they are dealing with in order to
assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the
potential victim.”97
The Court devoted little discussion to the other end of the balancing test,
individual privacy interests, except to state that “the Nevada statute does not
alter the nature of the stop itself.”98 Its dour view of the privacy interests
implicated by “stop and identify” statutes was revealed in the opinion’s
discussion of the Fifth Amendment issues: “Answering a request to disclose a
name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be
incriminating only in unusual circumstances.”99 Tipping the balance in favor
of the State, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment was not offended
when the deputy arrested Hiibel for failing to identify himself.100
Hiibel’s holding is not without potential limitations. The Court pointed out
that the Nevada statute requires only that a suspect divulge her name and that it
did not understand the statute to compel a suspect to turn over any
documentation, including a driver’s license.101 This may indicate that the
Court would not look favorably upon a statute that compels a Terry suspect to
disclose more information than a name or to produce some sort of
documentation. Furthermore, the Court stressed that the identification
94. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003).
95. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985);
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2459.
99. Id. at 2461.
100. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
101. Id. at 2457.
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requirement did not alter the duration or location of the detention,102 and that
the request for identification had to be “reasonably related to the circumstances
justifying the stop.”103 It should be noted, however, that these are questionable
limitations. After all, it is difficult to imagine when compelling answers to
other inquiries, such as destination or residency, will ever significantly affect
the duration or location of a Terry stop. Also, under the Court’s broad view of
the governmental interests furthered by identification, including advancing the
investigation and allowing an officer to assess the dangerousness of the
suspect, compelling identification will almost always be “reasonably related to
the circumstances justifying” a Terry stop. Thus, at this point it remains an
open question how a more intrusive “stop and identify” statute would fare
before the Court.
There is little doubt that the Court’s approach in Hiibel lends itself to
broader applicability. Given the Court’s emphasis on the importance of
permitting police questioning and investigation, and its rather dismissive
posture towards individual privacy interests, it would not be surprising if,
extending Hiibel, the Court were to approve of a more searching “stop and
identify” statute.104 With Hiibel, then, the Court delivered “stop and identify”
statutes their long awaited legal triumph. This was no small feat considering
the shroud of constitutional uncertainty surrounding “stop and identify”
statutes following Brown and Kolender. In so doing, the Hiibel Court effected
a dramatic moment in the expansion of the Terry doctrine, and, in the process,
jarred the previously stalwart notion of an absolute right to not speak in public.
IV. HIIBEL AND THE RIGHT TO NOT SPEAK
A.

The First Amendment

The Court in Hiibel did not explicitly address the First Amendment’s role
in a Terry stop, and the Court’s First Amendment decisions are distinct from
its cases analyzing the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, it is instructive that
in authorizing police officers to compel answers to questions regarding
identification, Hiibel’s outcome stands at odds with the well-established First
Amendment right to not speak. That the robust constitutional tradition of
protecting the right to not speak was not heeded in Hiibel suggests a potential
weakening in the right, at least at the margins of constitutionally protected
speech. Hiibel’s conflict with the right to not speak is more telling, however,
in demonstrating how great an expansion of police power the decision

102. Id. at 2459.
103. Id.
104. See infra notes 169–72 and accompanying text (discussing possible extensions of
Hiibel).
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represents. In order to appreciate this, it is helpful to consider the solid body of
precedential authority buttressing the right to not speak.105
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court
entertained a challenge to a West Virginia statute requiring, under threat of
criminal prosecution, that teachers and students participate in a patriotic salute
honoring the United States and its flag.106 The Court summed up the issue at
hand: “[W]e are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief. . . .
The issue here is whether this slow and easily neglected route to aroused
loyalties constitutionally may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory flag
salute and slogan.”107
The Court answered this question in the negative, noting that the Framers
recognized objections to coerced acceptance of political ideas.108 Writing in
the wake of political fascism’s apex and during the United States’s
participation in World War II, the Court cautioned, “Those who begin coercive
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard.”109 Such undesirable possibilities were what the Framers feared
and what the First Amendment was designed to avoid, the Court wrote.110
Accordingly, West Virginia’s attempts to forcibly indoctrinate children, while
more subtle, fell astray of the Constitution: “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”111
In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court made more explicit the constitutional
right to not speak developed in Barnette.112 There, the Court held that New
Hampshire acted in contravention of the Constitution in criminalizing
obstruction of the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” on state license plates. En
route to reaching this holding, the Court instructed that “the right of freedom of
105. For a general overview of the First Amendment right to not speak cases, see generally
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 356–369 (1999);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 804–06 (2d ed. 1988); Robert D.
Kamenshine, Reflections on Coerced Expression, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 101 (1999)
(surveying development of cases). This line of authority is also referred to as the “compelled
speech” doctrine. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra, at 356; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts after Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 697, 728 (2003); James P. Madigan, Questioning the Coercive Effect of Self-Identifying
Speech, 87 IOWA L. REV. 75, 101 (2001).
106. 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
107. Id. at 631 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 633.
109. Id. at 641.
110. Id.
111. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
112. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both
the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”113 This
was a fundamental tenet of the First Amendment’s broad aegis: “The right to
speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of
the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”114
The Court dispelled the notion that the right to not speak developed in
Barnette and Wooley occupied secondary constitutional status in Riley v.
National Federation of the Blind.115 There, North Carolina defended its
regulation of professional-fundraiser fees by contending that the First
Amendment interests in compelled speech are qualitatively less significant
than the interests implicated in suppressing speech, such that state-sponsored
schemes compelling silence ought to be reviewed under a more deferential
test.116 The Court rejected this contention, stating, “There is certainly some
difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context
of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for
the First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.”117
Significantly, the Riley Court noted that the First Amendment’s prohibition
on compelled speech included statements of fact, as well as statements of
opinion. Previous precedential authority stating that the First Amendment
protects the right not to speak, the Court wrote, “cannot be distinguished
simply because they involved compelled statements of opinion while here we
deal with compelled statements of ‘fact’: either form of compulsion burdens
Thus, North Carolina’s attempts to compel
protected speech.”118
communication of factual information related to professional-fundraiser fees
conflicted with the constitutional right to not speak just as plainly as did New
Hampshire’s attempts to compel opinion in Wooley.119
The prohibition against compelled speech carries over to factual
information regarding identity, where the line between idea and fact becomes
blurred. In Talley v. California, the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance
requiring that a handbill distributed publically contain the name and address of

113. Id. at 714.
114. Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). Accord Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (“There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas,
a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom
of speech in its affirmative aspect.”) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23
N.Y.2d 341, 348 (1968)).
115. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
116. Id. at 796.
117. Id. at 796–97.
118. Id. at 797–98.
119. See id. at 798.
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its sponsor.120 The Court expressed its high regard for anonymity. Recalling
the important role played by anonymous speech in the Revolutionary War, the
Court stated that “[i]t is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for
The Court reaffirmed the First
the most constructive purposes.”121
Amendment sanctity of anonymous speech thirty-five years later in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission.122 There, the Court invalidated an Ohio election
law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous leaflets in connection with
political campaigns. Especially with regard to public, political speech, the
Court opined that “[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the
majority.”123
Through these cases and others, the Court has stressed the constitutional
centrality of the right to not speak, a right that takes no second chair to the
affirmative right to speak. The Court has made clear that the right to not speak
is rooted in autonomy over one’s public image, as well as autonomy over one’s
thoughts.124 The First Amendment right to not speak recognizes factual
statements,125 and protects anonymity.126 Thus, it would seem that, generally
speaking, the First Amendment would prohibit the practice of compelling
factual information of identity in public.127 Until Hiibel, the Court’s decisions
treated the right to not speak as sacrosanct and intimated no suggestion that
this right might suffer erosion. Indeed, if anything, the Court’s more recent
language in support of the right to not speak resonated with the righteousness
of Barnette and Wooley.128 Hiibel, though, represents a sharp departure from

120. 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
121. Id.
122. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
123. Id. at 357.
124. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (invalidating requirement that the State
motto be displayed on license plates because it would force an objector to be “a ‘mobile
billboard’ for the State’s ideological message”); Kari M. Dahlin, Note, Actions Speak Louder
than Thoughts: The Constitutionally Questionable Reach of the Minnesota CLE Elimination of
Bias Requirement, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1725, 1737–39 (2000).
125. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988). See also Madigan,
supra note 105, at 127 (asserting that Riley’s most striking aspect was its recognition that
compelled statements of fact burden speech).
126. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
127. The general right to refrain from answering a police officer’s questions during an
ordinary police-civilian street encounter seems unperturbed by Hiibel. See infra notes 190–93
and accompanying text.
128. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 481 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that one of the principles of the First Amendment is “that compelling
cognizable speech officially is just as suspect as suppressing it, and is typically subject to the
same level of scrutiny.”); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (“‘Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what
to leave unsaid,’ one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who
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the trend toward safeguarding the right to not speak, whether as to opinion or
to fact. What this portends in the First Amendment arena remains to be seen.
In the Fourth Amendment context, Hiibel’s departure from the right to not
speak represents a turning of the tide.
B.

The Fourth Amendment

Hiibel’s impact on the right to not speak cannot be dismissed by pointing
out that Hiibel addresses only a Fourth Amendment challenge rather than a
First Amendment claim. A key premise underlying the Court’s creation of the
Terry doctrine and permissive acceptance of its expansion was the idea that an
individual detained during a Terry stop, while susceptible to a wide array of
police questioning, cannot be obligated to respond to an officer’s inquiries and
cannot be arrested for maintaining her silence in the face of persistent
questioning.129 Hiibel is all the more significant an expansion of the Terry
doctrine in that it parts company with the Court’s earlier statements regarding
compelled speech during a Terry encounter.
Originally, the Court’s approval of the “stop and frisk” at issue in Terry
was qualified by Justice White’s caution that while officers may ask questions
of the detainee, “the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not
be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it
may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”130 What the Court
had approved in Terry, the White concurrence indicated, was a temporary
seizure for investigative purposes and a limited search for weapons, not the
annulment of the probable cause requirement.131
Justice White’s words might have been marginalized more persuasively
due to their concurring status had the Court not later adopted them in
Berkemer. As support for its holding that the Miranda requirement bars
admission of post-arrest statements made by an arrestee but not pre-arrest
statements made a detainee during roadside questioning by a police officer, the
Court in Berkemer emphasized the relatively “nonthreatening character” of a
Terry traffic stop in comparison to a formal arrest.132 One aspect of a Terry
stop’s “nonthreatening character,” the Court explained, is that “the officer may
ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and
to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.
But the detainee is not obliged to respond. And, unless the detainee’s answers
chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to say.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
129. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2465 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
131. Id. Arguably, however, this is exactly what the Court did. See Amar, supra note 51, at
1118–20; Sundby, supra note 14, at 395.
132. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
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provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be
released.”133 Berkemer thus made clear that the right not to answer an officer’s
questions is a fundamental premise in permitting officers to detain and
question individuals without probable cause under Terry.
Given these prior statements by the Court disapproving of compelled
speech in the Terry context, the persuasiveness of the Court’s decision in
Hiibel turned on its ability to distinguish Justice White’s concurrence in Terry
and Berkemer=s adoption of that concurrence. In this regard, the Court’s
opinion came up short. First, the Hiibel Court summarily concluded that
Justice White’s concurrence and Berkemer’s adoption of it were dicta and
therefore not controlling.134 This conclusion, however, is disputable. Under
the commonly used definition, dictum is a statement “made during the course
of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in
the case and therefore not precedential.”135 Arguably, the Court’s statement in
Berkemer that a “detainee is not obliged to respond”136 to an officer’s inquiries
during a Terry stop is not dictum because it was necessary to demonstrate the
“nonthreatening character” of a Terry stop, which the Court was analogizing to
a traffic stop. The Court based its holding that a traffic stop is immune from
the dictates of Miranda based partly on this “nonthreatening character.”137
Without the statement that a detainee is not obligated to respond to an officer’s
questions, the “nonthreatening character” of a Terry stop and traffic stop would
certainly not have been as clear. Furthermore, as Justice Brennan once noted,
the fact that a particular statement is dictum is not an affirmative basis for

133. Id. at 439–40 (emphasis added) (citing Terry , 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring)).
134. 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
135. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999). See also In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447,
453 (5th Cir. 2004) (adopting Black’s definition of dictum); Best Life Assurance Co. v. Comm’r,
281 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
Judge Kozinski has etched out a more limited interpretation of what constitutes dictum
by defining legal precedent broadly: “[W]here a panel confronts an issue germane to the eventual
resolution of the case, and resolves it after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that
ruling becomes the law of the circuit, regardless of whether doing so is necessary in some strict
logical sense.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring). Judge Kozinski’s interpretation was adopted by at least one panel of the Ninth
Circuit. Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). This fact was
not lost on Judge Kozinski. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski,
J., concurring). Judge Kozinski added that the Black’s definition “is now so riddled with lesions
and encrustations we can never be quite sure which portions of our case law are holdings and
which dicta, unless and until the Oracle at Pasadelphi tells us.” Id. at 901 n.1 (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
136. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439.
137. Id. at 440.
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adopting the alternative.138 Indeed, in many instances, dicta and concurring
opinions have later been adopted as law by the Court.139
Second, the Hiibel Court stated that the relevant passages in the White
concurrence and Berkemer were not opinions as to the illegality of compelling
responses to police inquiries under all circumstances, but rather they were
recognitions that “the Fourth Amendment does not impose obligations on the
citizen but instead provides rights against the government.”140 Because the
source of the identification obligation in Hiibel was Nevada law and not the
Fourth Amendment, the Court opined that the statements in the White
concurrence and Berkemer regarding the illegality of compelling answers from
Terry suspects were inapposite: “As a result, we cannot view the dicta in
Berkemer or Justice White’s concurrence in Terry as answering the question
whether a State can compel a suspect to disclose his name during a Terry
stop.”141
The Hiibel Court’s interpretation of the White concurrence and Berkemer
rendered them redundant and nonsensical. Again, the relevant language from
the White concurrence: While “[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which
prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets . . .
the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled,
and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest . . . .”142 Under the Hiibel
Court’s interpretation of this statement, Justice White began by discussing the
Fourth Amendment as a protective mechanism (which does not prevent
officers from questioning a suspect) but then sharply shifted the analytical
paradigm, characterizing the Fourth Amendment as a font of obligations upon
the citizen (which does not obligate citizens to answer questions). This
interpretation is absurd. Even at the time Terry was decided, it was wellestablished that the Fourth Amendment functions as a restriction on

138. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 455 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting the two part test for determining
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred set forth in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Girardeau A. Spann,
Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1476-78 (1995) (discussing the Court’s
adoption in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 (1989), of dicta written in the
plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988), reallocating
the burden of proof in Title VII cases); Gary E. Newberry, Note, Constitutional Law:
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: Is the Public Forum a Closed
Category?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 156 n.8 (1993) (stating that in Commonwealth v. Davis, 167
U.S. 43 (1897), where the Court affirmed the conviction of a preacher who had violated a city
ordinance regulating speech in the Boston common, “[t]he Court adopted dicta from then
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes’ decision in the lower
court.”).
140. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459 (2004).
141. Id.
142. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
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governmental invasion of individual rights, not a source of obligations upon
the citizenry. One year after issuing its Terry opinion, the Court stated, “The
Fourth Amendment to our Constitution prohibits ‘unreasonable’ governmental
interference with the fundamental facet of individual liberty: ‘[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”143 Indeed,
from the founding of the nation, the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment
to limit government, not the rights of the people.144 The Court’s decisions
have repeatedly recognized the Fourth Amendment as a protective
constitutional provision.145 For Justice White to have devoted his concurrence
to the obvious, well-established, and somewhat trivial point that the Fourth
Amendment does not compel individuals to speak would have been as odd as it
was unnecessary.
This is especially evident focusing on the phrase “refusal to answer
furnishes no basis for arrest.” It would follow under the Hiibel Court’s reading
of this passage that Justice White was communicating his view that the Fourth
Amendment itself furnishes no basis for arresting individuals for failing to
provide identification. The Fourth Amendment, however, never functions as a
basis for arrest. It instead restricts governmental investigations and seizures,
which themselves are based on some underlying proscriptive statute.146 Thus,
Justice White=s statement under Hiibel’s interpretation would be wholly
meaningless, as would Berkemer’s citation and adoption of Justice White’s
concurrence. This is not distinguishment, but rather disfigurement. Logically,
it would follow that Justice White intended to describe the Fourth Amendment
in protective terms throughout his statement—to declare that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit officers from asking questions but does protect
143. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 202 (1969) (alteration in original). The Hiibel
Court, itself, noted this truism. See 124 S. Ct. at 2459 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not
impose obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights against the government.”).
144. ANN FAGAN GINGER, THE LAW, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 378
(1977) (stating that the Framers wrote the first ten amendments with the intent to limit the new
federal government that had been created); David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor
in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No,
73 MISS. L.J. 423, 438–39 (2003) (stating that the history of the Fourth Amendment reveals that it
was intended to serve as a limit on arbitrary government action).
145. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating
that the constitutional purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to preserve “respect for the privacy
of persons and the inviolability of their property”); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 589 n.5
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that exceptions to the warrant requirement impinge on
“the protective purpose of the Fourth Amendment”) (emphasis added); Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 482 (1965) (noting that the Fourth Amendment was “the product of contemporary
revulsion against a regime of writs of assistance,” and that its adoption “reflected the culmination
in England a few years earlier of a struggle against oppression which had endured for
centuries.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (stating that the Court has
recognized the “principle of protection” captured in the Fourth Amendment) (emphasis added).
146. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; supra note 144.
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suspects from being forced to answer those questions, even in the face of
statutory authority to the contrary.147 In rendering the White concurrence and
Berkemer’s adoption of it illogical, the Hiibel Court’s interpretation essentially
disregards the Court’s prior language in favor of its contrary conclusion.
By cavalierly distinguishing the Court’s previous statements that an
individual detained pursuant to Terry cannot be compelled to answer an
officer’s inquiries, the Court has disavowed a fundamental premise underlying
the Court’s creation and expansion of the Terry doctrine—that Terry suspects
cannot be compelled to answer officer inquiries. The Hiibel dissent noted this
in stating that, while the White concurrence and Berkemer’s adoption of it
were “technically dicta,” they were “the kind of strong dicta that the legal
community typically takes as a statement of the law. And that law has
remained undisturbed for more than 20 years.”148 Furthermore, the Hiibel
Court completely ignored Justice Brennan=s concurrence in Kolender, in which
Justice Brennan opined, based on the White concurrence, that the Fourth
Amendment does not permit an officer to compel a Terry suspect to identify
herself.149 Thus, long undisturbed language disapproving of compelling
speech during Terry stops was discarded in Hiibel. Had earlier members of the
Court known that Terry suspects would one day be compelled to answer an
officer’s inquiries, it is altogether possible that they would not have acquiesced
to the Terry doctrine’s expansion and immunization from the safeguards
accompanying arrest, such as Miranda warnings. By unbridling the Terry
doctrine from its earlier restrictions, the Hiibel Court has thrust open the door
to the Terry doctrine’s further expansion into new Fourth Amendment
frontiers.
V. HIIBEL AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HINTERLAND
A.

The Expansion of Searches and Seizures under Hiibel
1.

An Oral Communication of Identification as a Search

The question of whether or not a search has occurred centers on privacy.
In general, a search occurs when “an expectation of privacy that society is

147. Indeed, generally, in interpreting legal language, the more logical reading is favored.
See, e.g., United States v. Errol D., Jr., 292 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002) (Brunetti, J.,
dissenting) (favoring interpretation of Major Crimes Act that is most logical); Callas Enters., Inc.
v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 193 F.3d 952, 957 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999) (favoring logical
interpretation of complaint); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 593 (7th
Cir. 1989) (favoring logical interpretation of the Supreme Court’s language).
148. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2465 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
149. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 362 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”150 The Fourth Amendment, the
Court has stated, “protects people, not places.”151 What is and is not private is
determined by a combination of subjective expectation and societal acceptance
of that expectation.152 While there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
that which is exposed to the public, “what [a person] seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”153 Although oral communications of identity are not as commonly
associated with search and seizure as are narcotics or documents, the Court has
instructed that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches
extends to intangible oral communications irrespective of the “ancient niceties
of tort or real property law.”154
Surely, many people would have no problem providing police officers with
identifying information, as well as other information, upon request. The first
prong of the Katz test, however, is subjective. So long as an individual has a
personal expectation of privacy in her identifying information, part one of the
Katz test is satisfied.155 Applying the second part is more complicated—would
society consider an expectation of privacy in identifying information

150. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
151. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Professor Sundby has proposed that the
Fourth Amendment be understood as having a broader aim of fostering reciprocal trust between
the citizenry and the Government, rather than merely as an outpost for privacy. Scott E. Sundby,
“Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994). Focusing exclusively on privacy, he argues, makes the
Fourth Amendment too speculative, “rising or falling in both scope and protection” as society’s
notions of what is private have changed. Id. at 1758, 1760. It bears mentioning that under this
citizen-government trust framework, compelling identification from a Terry suspect would also
constitute a search since it connotes a lack of governmental regard for the dignity of the citizen in
maintaining silence. Arresting an individual for not providing adequate identification sounds in
totalitarianism. Id. at 1792–93.
152. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
153. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
154. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). See also Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 179–80 (1969) (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches covers covert recording of oral communications); Warden, Md.
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (“The premise that property interests control
the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.”). Courts have held various
governmental confiscations of intangible material to be searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment. E.g., Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2003) (images
captured on videotape); United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1334–35 (2d Cir. 1990)
(images captured on photograph); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986)
(visual inspection).
155. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 340 (2000); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979).
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reasonable?156 If the strong public reaction to Hiibel is any indication,157 it
seems that modern society recognizes as reasonable an expectation of privacy
in identifying information. The fact that people do not readily surrender their
names or identities when in public underscores this point.158 The advent of
mass solicitation, identity theft, and stalking crimes highlight the security and
privacy interests tied to identification.159 Protecting identifying information is
especially valuable in the internet age where the use, and abuse, of personal
information abounds.160 Indeed, Congress has recognized the important
individual privacy interests held in personal identifying information.161 While
it may be that society has not always been so protective of identifying

156. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
157. J.D. Ducas, Letter to the Editor, BOSTON HERALD, June 24, 2004, at 42 (stating that with
Hiibel, “[w]e’re beginning to resemble communist China more than freedom-loving America.”);
Louis Kwall, Supreme Court Is Chipping Away at Our Rights Series: Letters, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, June 24, 2004, at 15A (stating that, with Hiibel, “we are allowing the terrorists to win in
that they are causing us to change not only our way of life, but also our core values.”);
Commentary, What’s In a Name? Police Power, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 22, 2004 (stating
that Hiibel erodes Fourth Amendment protections and “is a serious undermining of privacy
rights.”); Editorial, Having to “Kowtow”, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 22, 2004 (stating that
the Hiibel decision “is just the latest of many ways in which the court has poked holes in our
cherished right of privacy.”); Opinion, Court Erodes Right to Remain Silent; Why an Exception to
a Constitutional Right?, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 22, 2004, at 30A (telling readers that, with
Hiibel, “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court took away a tiny bit of your independence Monday, a little
piece of the individual autonomy that sets Americans apart from the citizens of so many other
nations.”). See also Editorial, Don’t Make Criminals of Citizens Who Remain Silent, DETROIT
NEWS, Mar. 27, 2004, at 5 (prior to issuance of the Hiibel opinion, urging Court to side with
Hiibel).
158. Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L.
REV. 117, 117 (1996) (stating that people generally prize their anonymity and “selectively reveal
information about [them]selves to some and withhold it from others.”); Carol Brooks Gardner,
Access Information: Public Lies and Private Peril, 35 SOC. PROBS. 384, 387 (1988) (stating that
anonymity is normal behavior that aids in our interactions, especially with strangers).
159. In fact, the Department of Justice’s public educational materials on identity theft
cautions that one should “[b]e stingy about giving out your personal information to others unless
you have a reason to trust them, regardless of where you are.” U.S. Department of Justice
website, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/idtheft.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
Although many people would not fear that police officers would misuse their information, Hiibel,
apparently, lacked a reason to trust the sheriff’s deputy who ordered him to identify himself.
160. See Harry A. Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound
Internet Safety Policies, STAN. TECH. L. REV. para. 119 (2004) (stating that “as more of us
become more comfortable with using the Internet for everyday activities, we become more
vulnerable to new types of privacy invasions.”); Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but is it Mine?
Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 422–24 (2003)
(highlighting significant costs expended in protecting privacy in the internet).
161. See The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2004)
(regulating the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state motor vehicle
departments).
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information, the Court has recognized that notions of what constitute
acceptable privacy interests can evolve over time, mirroring changes in societal
norms.162
Furthermore, surrendering identifying information to governmental
authorities is qualitatively different from giving a name to some private party
(a marketer, new acquaintance, etc.). First, of course, providing a private party
with identifying information is consensual, which is not the case where officers
compel identification through a “stop and identify” statute. Even a successful
request for identification under those circumstances would be based on “no
more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”163 and thus be
involuntary. Second, the Government has the capacity to use your name or
other nonpublic identifying information to access unparalleled amounts of
personal information.164 The Court has indicated that while the use of
technology to enhance investigatory capabilities does not automatically
establish a search,165 it is more likely that a search has occurred within the
meaning of Katz when that technology is “not in general public use”166 and
circumvents the protections of the Fourth Amendment.167 The informational
databases available to governmental authorities in conducting background
checks are not in general public use. Although it will be pointed out that the
personal information is already stored with various governmental agencies
before police officers obtain a suspect’s name, merely possessing personal
information is significantly different from linking that information to a name
and face. In this sense, it is important not to lose sight of the context: a
162. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (recognizing technology has
affected the “degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment”).
163. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968).
164. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2464 (2004) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (stating that “[a] name can provide the key to a broad array of information about
the person, particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement
databases.”); Martin Finucane, For Police, It’s Gun, Badge and Blackberry — Use of Hand-held
Devices to Access Databases Stirs Privacy Concerns, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 25,
2004, at 10 (stating that police departments are purchasing hand-held wireless devices for use on
patrols that permit officers to access “computerized dossiers on people on demand.”). The Hiibel
Court acknowledged as much, stating that “[k]nowledge of identity may inform an officer that a
suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder.” 124 S. Ct.
at 2458.
165. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (stating that use of airplane to
conduct search of curtilage did not establish a search); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227, 238–39 (1986) (approving of use of enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex).
166. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
167. Cf. John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial
Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 84–85 (2002) (arguing that when
officers use facial-scanning technology to obtain personal information that would otherwise not
be available to them and thus make “an end run around the Fourth Amendment[,]” a search has
occurred).
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criminal investigation. Officers will tie the personal information to an
individual as a possible perpetrator of criminal activity. Perhaps because of the
substantial personal information governmental authorities can access using a
name, it is not uncommon for those who come in contact with the police, both
as victims and suspects of crimes, to refuse to identify themselves.168
Considering a police officer’s technological superiority in using
identification to access wider information on a suspect’s background,
compelling a Terry suspect to identify herself under penalty of arrest through a
“stop and identify” statute is only a few degrees removed from an officer
threatening a suspect with arrest unless she opens the trunk of her car. It is an
act that forces an individual to expose personal information. Not every person
will consider providing identification to be substantially intrusive, just as not
every person objects strongly to allowing officers to view the automobile
trunk. All the same, in light of the potential to uncover sensitive information,
both acts implicate expectations of privacy that society would consider
reasonable.169 Therefore, compelling identification during a Terry stop is a
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
2.

Broadening a Terry Search and Seizure

Although it sanctions the seizure of identifying information, the Hiibel
decision devotes little discussion to the original rationale for permitting a
nonconsensual search and seizure during a Terry encounter: discovery of
concealed weapons to protect officers. Instead, Hiibel’s central concern is the
important investigatory interests furthered by compelled identification.170 The
opinion mentions officer safety only to say that investigating officers “need to
know whom they are dealing with.”171 Terry, however, does not grant such
wide latitude to search. In Terry, the Court stated that a search must “be

168. Karen Abbott, Warnings Precede Party Conventions; FBI, Police Visits to Young People
Rile ACLU Official, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 24, 2004, at 4A (reporting on Denver-area activists
who refused to give their names to police officers, who in turn refused to give their names to the
activists); Dan Chapman, Give Name or Go to Jail: Court Upholds Power to Arrest, ATLANTA J.CONST., June 22, 2004, at A1 (discussing protestors’ refusal to give names during the civil rights
movement and anti-abortion demonstrations in 1988); Law & Order, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland) ,
Oct. 25, 2002, at B3 (reporting that a shooting suspect refused to give his name to police but was
later identified through fingerprints); Dan Benson, Firework Debris May Have Fallout,
MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, July 11, 2002, at 3B (reporting on victim who did not want to give her
name to police); Law & Order, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 29, 2002, at 35 (reporting on
a robbery and assault victim who refused to give his name to police); Ed Hayward, Several
Hospitalized in Hub Following Weekend Melees, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 12, 1999, at 13
(reporting on weekend melees in which one injured man refuse to give his name to the police).
169. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
170. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004).
171. Id.
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confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives,
clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.”172 In
Michigan v. Long, the Court reaffirmed that the Terry doctrine permits
searches intended to protect the officer, but only for the purpose of discovering
weapons.173 Indeed, the Court has cautioned that “[i]f the protective search
goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no
longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.”174 Terry thus
created “a limited right of ‘self defense’ for a police officer who in carrying
out her duties comes across someone whom she reasonably believes is armed
and dangerous.”175
Hiibel, though, takes a different path by advancing a non-weapons-based
officer safety justification for the search and seizure: information regarding a
suspect’s background. However, whatever the safety advantages afforded by
compelling identification, they are too attenuated from a search for weapons to
be justified under Terry’s weapon-based rationale for protective searches. If
Hiibel is to serve as a blueprint for future Terry doctrine cases, the Court has
swept aside a significant restriction on Terry searches. Hiibel, therefore,
signals the arrival of a breed of Terry search that is far broader than the “stop
and frisk” approved of in Terry.
Moreover, Hiibel makes no mention of the requirement that a Terry
investigation be “confined in scope.”176 In Florida v. Royer, the Court stated
that in carrying out a Terry stop, the “investigative methods employed should
be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify . . . the officer’s
suspicion in a short period of time.”177 Yet, the Hiibel Court disregarded this
admonition, instead emphasizing the de minimis aspect of the compelled
identification and thus harkening to the per curiam approach in Mimms.178
Surely, considering Royer’s admonition, there were less intrusive means to
verify or dispel the deputy’s suspicions than forcing Hiibel to identify himself
under penalty of arrest and prosecution.179 Although a history of prior criminal
acts might have indicated that Hiibel was statistically more likely than a person
without a criminal record to engage in future criminal activity,180 the presence
172. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
173. 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (stating that under Terry “protection of police and others can
justify protective searches”).
174. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993).
175. Sundby, supra note 53, at 1135.
176. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
177. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
178. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (characterizing the disclosure of a
name as vastly Ainsignificant in the scheme of things@).
179. There is no indication in the decision of whether the deputy attempted to question the
daughter or to look for visible evidence of domestic assault.
180. JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL
TECHNIQUES 104–05 (1981) (concluding that violent crime in particular is the most reliable
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or absence of such a record would not answer the specific investigative inquiry
of whether Hiibel had committed domestic assault and thus would have
required further investigation in any case. The Court, however, expressed no
interest in determining whether the State’s arrest and prosecution of Hiibel was
the “least intrusive means reasonably available” for investigating the domestic
violence report. In ignoring the rule that a Terry investigation be restricted in
scope, Hiibel grants broad investigatory license to officers at the expense of
Terry suspects.
Hiibel can thus be understood to represent the triumph of the de minimis
approach within Terry jurisprudence. As manifested in Hiibel, the Mimms
dissenters’ fear of a precipitous slippery slope eroding the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause requirement for seizures has proven prescient.
Under the majority’s analysis, it is no chimerical stretch to conclude that other
identifying factual information such as a suspect’s address, ultimate destination
of travel, or residency status may be compelled in the future.181 Such
information has just as tangential a connection to officer safety as the name at
issue in Hiibel. It is not hard to imagine what other sorts of investigative
methods police might lawfully pursue during a Terry stop under the de
minimis approach: fingerprinting,182 demanding production of documents,183
indication of future violent crime); Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of
Court-Restrained Male Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, in DO ARRESTS AND
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 193–202 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (stating
that age and prior criminal history are statistically significant in indicating future domestic
violence); Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 721–22 (1998)
(“Recidivism data, whatever its faults and shortcomings, at a minimum shows that someone who
has been convicted and imprisoned for a criminal offense is many times more likely to commit a
similar offense than a person chosen at random.”). Cf. id. at 721 n.10 (noting that “prediction of
future crime based on prior offenses is fraught with difficulties”).
181. Based on Hiibel, the Fourth Circuit has already seemingly approved of compelling
information regarding immigration status, though the facts given in the opinion were sparse.
United States v. Castillo-Cuevas, No. 04-4155, slip op. at 2, 3 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2004) (per
curiam).
182. The Court, in Hayes v. Florida, suggested in dictum that on-site fingerprinting absent
probable cause is permissible under the Fourth Amendment:
There is thus support in our cases for the view that the Fourth Amendment would permit
seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect
has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that
fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that crime, and if the
procedure is carried out with dispatch.
470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985).
183. Even before Hiibel, some courts had approved of searching a suspect’s wallet during a
Terry stop. E.g., United States v. Garcia, 942 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that a search
of a defendant’s wallet during a Terry stop was reasonable when border patrol agents had
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was an illegal alien and the defendant refused to disclose
his identity or citizenship status); People v. Loudermilk, 241 Cal. Rptr. 208, 210, 212 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) (permitting search of wallet during Terry stop). Most courts that have addressed the
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skin and hair sampling,184 or facial scanning.185 With these sorts of
investigative tactics lurking on the horizon, it becomes problematic to sincerely
characterize a Terry stop as a “far more minimal intrusion” than a traditional
arrest.186
B.

The Growing Fourth Amendment Hinterland Between Freedom and
Arrest

In first authorizing “stop and frisk” searches, the Supreme Court stressed
that it was creating a limited exception to the overarching constitutional
requirement that probable cause accompany any seizure and search. Since
then, however, the Court has expanded the breadth of a Terry stop well beyond
its original, limited beginnings. In this sense, the Hiibel decision is another
step in the Court’s steady expansion of governmental power and authority
during a Terry stop. By divorcing a Terry suspect from well-established
constitutional rights that would otherwise be available, however, Hiibel is a
particularly significant step in the continuing journey of Terry expansion.
Hiibel deepens the chasm between ordinary street encounters with police and
Terry stops. At the same time, Terry stops remain distinct from traditional
arrests. Hiibel and its predecessors have created, through the Terry doctrine, a
sort of Fourth Amendment hinterland permitting suspension of fundamental
constitutional rights and arrest-like seizures based on reasonable suspicion
alone.
The general right to not speak has developed into an entrenched
constitutional right as applied to both opinion,187 and fact.188 In the Fourth
Amendment context, the Court has observed that the right to not speak holds
during ordinary police-civilian street encounters. Justice Harlan, concurring in
Terry, opined that, just as an officer does not offend the Fourth Amendment by
issue, however, have held that officers may not search a suspect’s wallet during a Terry stop.
E.g., State v. Webber, 694 A.2d 970, 972 (N.H. 1997); Baldwin v. State, 418 So. 2d 1219, 1220
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Newman, 637 P.2d 143, 146 (Or. 1981); Schraff v. State, 544
P.2d 834, 851 (Alaska 1975). The Hiibel Court’s limiting language that it did not understand the
Nevada statute to compel a suspect to turn over any documentation, see Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at
2457, gives no insight into how it would rule on a Terry search of a wallet.
184. See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 455, 461 (2001) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment does not preclude DNA
sampling from arrestees, but that such a sampling system would have to “incorporate stringent
controls on the scope of the information extracted from the samples and the dissemination of that
information.”).
185. See Brogan, supra note 167, at 67–69 (discussing facial scanning technology and
arguing that wide area facial scans are unconstitutional per se, while focused facial scans are
constitutional if accompanied by reasonable suspicion).
186. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
187. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977).
188. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988).
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addressing questions to others she encounters, “ordinarily the person addressed
has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away.”189 Moreover, in
Florida v. Royer, the Court noted that, absent reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, an individual approached by a police officer “need not answer any
question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and
may go on his way.”190 This remains the law, even after Hiibel.
Apart from ordinary police-civilian street encounters, however, the wellsettled constitutional right to not speak does not apply during a Terry stop.
Under Hiibel, officers may compel any person whom they reasonably suspect
of unlawful activity to identify themselves.191 This establishes a stark contrast
of liberty rights between a Terry stop and non-obligatory street encounters
where an individual “need not answer any question put to him.”192 While
Terry stops have always been understood to be a restriction on liberty,193 the
Court has described a Terry stop as a “minimal” and “limited” intrusion upon
With Hiibel permitting offhanded revocation of
individual liberty.194
constitutional rights during a Terry stop, however, it cannot be said that a Terry
stop is only a marginal imposition on personal liberty. A Terry stop has thus
become sharply severed from ordinary street life.
At the same time, Hiibel maintains the increasingly untenable doctrinal
divide between a Terry stop and a formal arrest. If the facts in Hiibel had
occurred against the backdrop of a formal arrest, the deputy would have been
required to possess probable cause and would have likely read Hiibel his
Miranda warnings before forcing him to speak in order to preserve any
potentially incriminating comments for trial.195 Paradoxically, these additional
protections were unavailable to Hiibel precisely because officers possessed a
lesser degree of suspicion of wrongdoing and seized Hiibel in a manner that, in
theory, is less intrusive than an arrest. Given the additional individual
safeguards and procedural hurdles accompanying a formal arrest, it is not
difficult to surmise that, if they had their druthers, police officers would prefer
189. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
190. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). See also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125
(reaffirming Royer’s holding that “when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his
business.”).
191. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004).
192. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498.
193. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
194. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (describing a Terry stop as a “minimal intrusion”); United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (describing a Terry stop as “brief and narrowly
circumscribed”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 366 n.4 (1983) (describing a Terry
encounter as “limited”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (describing a Terry stop as a “wholly different kind
of intrusion upon individual freedom”).
195. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (stating that Miranda warnings are
required for post-arrest custodial interrogation).
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to initially approach a suspect possessing only reasonable suspicion rather than
probable cause.196
On the whole, then, Hiibel broadens the gray area, largely barren of
constitutional safeguards, between freedom and arrest. A dexterous and
amorphous creature, distinct from freedom and divorced from arrest, the Terry
stop thrives in this peculiar no-man’s land. With the power to suspend the
fundamental constitutional right to not speak, it is clear that a Terry stop is far
removed from the freedom an individual enjoys before arousing suspicion. On
the other hand, a Terry stop is unburdened by the heightened proof
requirements and Fifth Amendment protections applicable to a formal arrest.
Considering the state of the Terry doctrine following Hiibel, it is apparent that
the Terry stop has morphed into an existence far removed from its humble
“stop and frisk” origins. With officers able to compel individuals reasonably
suspected of committing a crime to identify themselves under Hiibel, the
notion that the Terry doctrine might “swallow the general rule that Fourth
Amendment seizures are >reasonable= only if based on probable cause[,]”197 as
earlier feared by members of the Court,198 is far from fanciful.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH:
REVALUING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY INTERESTS
It is apparent from the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion that the
intensified post-9/11 security paradigm played a key role in the court’s
decision. The Nevada Supreme Court issued its decision in Hiibel on
December 20, 2002, a little more than fifteen months following the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In
holding that the Nevada “stop and identify” statute did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, the court, identifying the significant governmental interests
served by compelled identification, observed, “[m]ost importantly, we are at
war against enemies who operate with concealed identities and the dangers we
face as a nation are unparalleled.”199 The court referred to the terrorist attacks
of September 11th, the Washington, D.C. sniper killings, and the white-powder
Anthrax scares that followed. Quoting the President, the Court stated that “[i]t
cannot be stressed enough: ‘This is a different kind of war that requires a
different type of approach and a different type of mentality.’”200 The court
thus suggested that in the post-9/11 world the manner of evaluating individual
196. Cf. Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16
CONST. COMMENT. 491, 494 (1999) (stating that the Terry doctrine’s expansion has “permit[ted]
numerous police practices to flourish, unaccompanied by probable cause, a warrant, or, in many
cases, any level of suspicion at all.”).
197. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979).
198. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 510 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
199. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Humboldt, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002).
200. Id.
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privacy rights under the Bill of Rights had been inexorably altered. Given the
looming terrorist threat, the court would accordingly afford greater deference
to police officers investigating suspicious activity during a Terry stop.201
Undoubtedly, the terrorist attacks of September 11th created a momentous
shift in the nation’s collective security outlook. Significant measures were
taken both internationally and domestically to address the terrorist threat,
including the creation of an executive agency, the Department of Homeland
Security, which subsumed and reorganized previously existing administrative
agencies and is charged with coordinating domestic security.202 Although the
Supreme Court’s Hiibel opinion did not refer to the September 11th terrorist
attacks, the United States, arguing as amici in support of Nevada, noted the
Nevada Supreme Court’s reference to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and mentioned
identification of persons on terrorist “watch lists” as an important justification
for the Nevada “stop and identify” statute.203 Whether the terrorist attacks of
September 11th affected the Court’s decision in Hiibel is unknown. Clearly,
however, the dramatic post-9/11 shift in governmental attitudes towards
security did not pass unnoticed.204 That the traumatic events of September
11th would affect the balancing of governmental interests and privacy interests
in evaluating the validity of a Fourth Amendment claim is understandable and
permissible.205 The more perilous security conditions brought to light by the
terrorist attacks, however, do not justify broad infringements on the individual
rights secured by the Constitution.206 In this sense, the Court’s comments over

201. Id.
202. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(current version at 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2004)).
203. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Supporting Respondent at 14–15, Hiibel v. Sixth
Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
204. Docketed on the same 2003 term and argued approximately one month after Hiibel were
two cases involving the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens suspected of terrorist activity, Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004), and one
case involving the legal status of enemy combatants held at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
205. See Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 777–78 (2004) (stating that traditional Fourth Amendment analysis is
inadequate “in an age of weapons of mass destruction and potential terrorism,” and proposing an
extension of the “special needs” exception to the probable cause requirement to account for this
inadequacy). See also Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 417 (2002)
(stating that if the Court were to grant police officers broader investigative authority in the name
of combating terrorism, “it will face increased pressure to impose additional limitations on police
powers in very minor cases” because reasonableness analysis “cannot be allowed to become a
‘one way street, to be used only to water down’ Fourth Amendment rights” (quoting Gooding v.
United States, 416 U.S. 430, 495 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting))).
206. See Gould & Stern, supra note 205, at 830 (warning, in proposing an exception to the
probable cause requirements in the case of catastrophic threats, that “courts as well as citizens
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half-a-century ago in Barnette, decided after the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor and during the tumultuous national emergency of World War II, are
instructive. Although the Barnette Court acknowledged the importance of
promoting patriotism among the population, especially during wartime, the
Court warned that the noble aim of strengthening the nation could not be
achieved at the cost of waylaying the Bill of Rights.207 Constitutional rights,
the Court instructed, were not impediments to national strength and unity, but
rather vehicles towards that end: “Government of limited power need not be
anemic government. Assurance that rights are secure tends to diminish fear
and jealousy of strong government, and by making us feel safe to live under it
makes for its better support.”208 Certainly, the present “war against terror” is
unlike the United States’s previous military struggles. Barnette’s admonition,
however, still serves as a relevant reminder of the importance of Constitutional
rights.
In considering a remedy for the potential evils of unchecked expansion of
the Terry doctrine, a measured approach is appropriate. It makes little sense to
suggest discarding the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis that formed
the basis for the Terry doctrine’s expansion and sowed the seeds of the Hiibel
decision.209 It is similarly foolish to imagine that the necessities of law
enforcement will not play a critical role in future Terry stop cases, especially
given the post-9/11 security context.210 Any plausible approach, therefore,
should weave into the existing reasonableness framework. This does not imply
limitation, but rather possibility. Indeed, one of the principal virtues of
reasonableness analysis is its ability to accommodate a variety of factual

must be mindful to avoid the risk, if possible, that a solution designed to prevent wholesale
destruction of life and property does not destroy the basis values that undergird our civic life.”);
Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth
Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1364–65 (2004)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment challenge posed by the war on terror is “to assure that, even
as courts allow government officials to hunt more vigorously for evidence of criminal activity or
signs of terrorist threats, and use new technologies to do so, they do not compromise those core
privacy protections that are integral to a free society.”).
207. W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636–37 (1943).
208. Id. at 636.
209. Sundby, supra note 53, at 1134 (acknowledging that “[t]he Reasonableness Clause is
now an important part of Fourth Amendment analysis and it is unrealistic and, perhaps, unwise to
urge a return to the pre-Terry days when the Reasonableness Clause largely served as a redundant
way of saying a ‘warrant based on probable cause.’”).
210. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
222 (1998) (“In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper balance
between freedom and order. In wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance
shifts . . . in favor of order—in favor of the government’s ability to deal with conditions that
threaten the national well-being.”).
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scenarios and at the same time account for evolving societal norms.211 With
regard to halting the steady expansion of the Terry doctrine that ultimately
produced Hiibel, it is not the mere use of the reasonableness balancing test that
must be reevaluated but the manner in which courts employ the reasonableness
test: Individual privacy interests must be given due weight as they are balanced
against governmental law enforcement interests.
Individual privacy interests have not been adequately accounted for over
the course of the Terry doctrine’s expansion.212 Governmental interests have
generally trumped individual privacy interests in the name of furthering law
enforcement needs.213 In effect, what is reflected in Hiibel and other Terrydoctrine expansion cases is the triumph of the de minimis approach, first
articulated in Mimms.214 Following Mimms, the Court has justified extensions
of police authority during a Terry stop as “minimal”215 or “insignificant”216
intrusions on individual privacy interests.217 This is problematic. Use of the
de minimis approach overly minimizes the individual privacy interests at stake
during a Terry encounter. Over time, any privacy interest can be overcome by
incremental application of the de minimis approach. The de minimis approach
is not neutral; it favors governmental interests over privacy interests.218 Courts
have not employed the de minimis approach to justify “minor” restrictions on
police authority—a sort of negative de minimis approach; rather the de
minimis approach operates only to augment police authority.

211. See Amar, supra note 51, at 1118 (stating that reasonableness’s spacious quality “is one
of its virtues.”). Cf. Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the
Supreme Court’s Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1418–25 (2003)
(arguing that reasonableness is a shifting concept in Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).
212. Cooper, supra note 63, at 892–93 (discussing the levels of discretion afforded a finding
of reasonable suspicion on appellate review and arguing that, based on the discretion accorded a
finding of reasonable suspicion, “we cannot say individuals’ privacy interests have any real
weight in the [Terry] balancing test.”).
213. See Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment: The Right of the People to Be Secure in
Their Persons, Homes, Papers, and Effects, in A TIME FOR CHOICES 31, 33 (Claudia A. Haskel &
Jean H. Otto eds., 1991) (arguing that it is not surprising that government interests prevail when
the balancing test is used since “[t]his is usually the result when the Court utilizes what the
dissenters aptly called ‘a formless and unguided “reasonableness” balancing inquiry’”); Charles
A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1417 (1991) (stating that in the 1989-90
Supreme Court term, individual privacy interests were typically minimized when contrasted with
State interests).
214. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
215. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1997).
216. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (2004).
217. Trappings of the de minimis approach were also evident before Mimms in United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, where the Court stated that the intrusion on privacy interests caused by a
routine check-point stop “is quite limited.” 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976).
218. E.g., Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414–15; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111.
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Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis cannot function so
disproportionately. Individual privacy interests must be properly valued in
assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s coercive power during a Terry
stop. To pay short shrift to privacy interests contravenes the very purpose of
the Fourth Amendment: to safeguard the people from unwarranted
governmental intrusion.219 Perhaps Justice Jackson, who served as the chief
U.S. prosecutor before the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, was in the best
position to articulate the importance of upholding the rights conferred by the
Fourth Amendment in the midst of a crisis of unprecedented political upheaval.
Justice Jackson’s legal jurisprudence was profoundly influenced by World War
II and his experiences in Nuremberg,220 which he deemed “the most important,
enduring, and constructive work of my life.”221 His views on the Fourth
Amendment following his return to the Court are enlightening:
[The rights ensured by the Fourth Amendment], I protest, are not mere
second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms.
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons
in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to
have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities
but deprived of these rights to know that the human personality deteriorates
and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions
are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.222

219. See Harris, supra note 144, at 439 (stating that the historical evidence shows that “the
Fourth Amendment was intended to limit government action and discretion to conduct . . .
searches and seizures without warrants.”); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 228–29 (1993) (arguing that the “historical evidence”
suggests that the “broad principle embodied in the Reasonableness Clause is that discretionary
police power implicating Fourth Amendment interests cannot be trusted.”); Donald L. Doernberg,
The Right of the People: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth
Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 260 (1983) (“The fourth amendment was intended both to
protect the rights of individuals and to prevent the government from functioning as in a police
state.”). See also Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781,
829–30 (1997) (stating that the first eight amendments to the Constitution “stemmed from a
general fear that the national government was empowered by the Constitution to invade
well-established rights of importance to the people.”).
220. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 842
(1994) (stating that “Justice Jackson returned to the Supreme Court a fervent believer in the
warrant requirement.”); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Justice Jackson and the Nuremberg Trials, 1996 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 105, 114 (1996).
221. Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE
EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG xxxvii (1954).
222. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Reasonableness analysis must take account of the central, privacy-guarding
function the Fourth Amendment has played in U.S. jurisprudence.
Fundamentally, the reasonableness balancing test must disavow the de minimis
approach altogether so that both governmental law enforcement interests and
individual privacy interests are weighed against each other, independent of any
built-in, doctrinal bias. Mindful of the high value historically placed on
constitutional rights, individual privacy interests must be properly valued in the
balancing test. By no means does this suggest that privacy interests should
always trump governmental interests. Such a myopic focus on individual
privacy interests would be just as wrongheaded as a reasonableness analysis
perpetually favoring governmental interests.223 Rather what is needed is an
impartial balancing test in which there is no intimation that the outcome is
predetermined.224
Just as the Court in Barnette and Justice Jackson in Brinegar recognized
the importance of upholding individual constitutional rights at the height of
one of the most significant struggles in U.S. history, the profound value of the
Constitution’s safeguards on individual privacy interests should not be lost
upon us now. The country has undergone grave challenges in the past yet
maintained its adherence to the ideals expressed in the Bill of Rights. As we
deal with the challenges presented in the present era, we should heed the
Court’s instruction and Justice Jackson’s views that the rights conferred upon
the people by the Constitution are a source of strength, not a vulnerability.
VII. CONCLUSION
Hiibel’s impact on the Terry doctrine cannot be overstated. Although it is
only one of many cases to have extended the original boundaries of a Terry
stop, Hiibel affects a privilege previously thought to have been left intact by
Terry: the right not to speak. In reaching this result, Hiibel overrides prior
language from the Court suggesting that police officers violate the Fourth
Amendment by compelling Terry suspects to identify themselves.

223. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (stating that “while the
Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”).
224. Commentators have suggested that the current reasonableness balancing test implicitly
favors governmental interests over individual privacy interests. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz,
Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554
(1992) (stating that when reasonableness analysis “applies, the government wins, save perhaps for
a few egregious cases.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the
Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 109 (stating that “[d]eference to alleged
governmental interests now appears to be the rule.”); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in
the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1188–89 (1988) (stating that use of the balancing test contributes to the
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights); Sundby, supra note 14, at 400–01 (arguing that the
balancing test favors government intrusion).
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Perhaps the most significant aspect of Hiibel for Fourth Amendment
purposes is its potential to broaden the scope of permissible searches and
seizures during a Terry encounter. By minimizing the rule that a Terry search
must be limited to a search for weapons and confined in scope, the door is
open to increasingly sweeping Terry searches. At this historical juncture, the
balance of governmental law-enforcement interests and individual privacy
interests seems skewed in favor of enhancing investigatory power.
Hiibel’s significant contribution to the steady expansion of the Terry
doctrine is illustrative of the broadening Fourth Amendment hinterland
between freedom and arrest now occupied by the Terry doctrine. While
described as “less intrusive of a person’s liberty interests than a formal
arrest[,]”225 or “a far more minimal intrusion”226 than an arrest, a Terry stop, as
it develops more arrest-like attributes and permits a wide range of law
enforcement activity, has grown well beyond its Warren Court britches. The
Court’s endorsement of compelled identification in Hiibel has elevated a Terry
stop to a unique position in Fourth Amendment law. Far removed from
freedom where the constitutional right to not speak is by all indications intact,
yet unfettered by the restrictions applicable to formal arrest, the Terry doctrine
now grants officers the authority to compel identification. Indeed, by
loosening the Terry doctrine from its original moorings, Hiibel may be the
harbinger of a revamped Terry doctrine that would scarcely be recognizable to
the Terry Court.
If the continuing expansion of the Terry doctrine is to be reined in and
future broad extensions of police authority such as Hiibel are to be avoided,
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis cannot continue to operate in a
disparate manner. The use of the de minimis approach in reasonableness
balancing only works to augment police authority during a Terry stop. In order
to accord proper deference to the high historical value placed in the Fourth
Amendment and to return to the Court’s original intent in Terry of strictly
circumscribing police authority during a Terry stop, the de minimis approach
must be renounced. An unbiased reasonableness balancing approach must
weigh governmental law enforcement interests equally against individual
privacy interests. Only then can the slippery slope of eroding individual rights,
steepened by Hiibel, be leveled to parity.

225. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983).
226. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
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